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Abstract 
The Covid-19 pandemic is a significant disruption for the performance of contractual 
obligations. Contracts often contain a force majeure clause that lays out the circumstances 
under which a contract can be terminated or suspended. However, not all contracts contain 
such a clause, or the clause might not cover the current situation. In the absence of a force 
majeure or similar type clause the applicable law fills that gap.  
 
This paper concentrates on international commercial law contracts and transnational 
commercial law; it specifically focuses on the Convention for the International Sale of 
Goods,1 the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts,2 and the 
principles of the lex mercatoria. This paper analyses how these instruments could be 
applied if the contractual parties do not meet their obligations because of the Covid-19 
pandemic.  
 
 
 
I. Transnational Commercial Contracts in Times of Corona 
 
a) Introduction 
 
The Covid-19 pandemic significantly disrupts the performance of a large number of 
contracts. This can be because the performance of the contract is now impossible, illegal, 
no longer necessary, onerous, or simply inconvenient for the contracting parties. The key 
question is how the law deals with non-performance caused by the pandemic. In most 
cases hopefully the parties will come to an amicable agreement about the termination or 
modification of the contract. In other cases, however, that might not be possible; one of 
the parties may not wish to terminate/modify or the parties cannot reach agreement on 
how consequences of any changes should be attributed. 
 
This paper analyses contractual disruption due to Covid-19 focussing on international 
commercial law contracts and transnational commercial regulations. This entails contracts 
where both parties operate in a commercial capacity and concerns sales, services, hire-
purchase, and agency agreements among others. International commercial law contracts 
regularly include non-state rules such as transnational commercial law instruments or the 
lex mercatoria in the choice of law clause, either as the applicable law or by reference as 
contractual rules. Even in the absence of any reference in the contract, arbitrators and 
courts apply non-state rules with some regularity.  
 
The Convention for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the UNIDROIT Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts (UPICC) are two of the most prominent examples 
of transnational commercial instruments. This paper analyses how these instruments could 
be applied if the contractual parties do not meet their obligations because of the pandemic. 
1 United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods (adopted 11 April 1980, entered into force 
1 January 1988). 
2 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2016 edition). 
It furthermore examines how a court or tribunal would decide on issues related to the 
pandemic if the lex mercatoria is applied. The next section discusses the relationship 
between the force majeure clause and the applicable law. The following part introduces 
the CISG and the UPICC and discusses how these instruments approach force majeure. 
The final part examines how, when applying the lex mercatoria, the court/tribunal could 
deal with breach of contract resulting from Covid-19 and concludes with some reflections 
on the likely effect of Covid-19 in relation to contractual modification or termination under 
transnational commercial law. 
 
b) Force Majeure and the Applicable Law 
 
The court/tribunal firstly looks at the contractual provisions, given that the contract is said 
to be the first source of contract law.3 Contracts often contain a force majeure and/or 
hardship clause (or similar) that will lay out the circumstances under which a contract can 
be cancelled, modified, or suspended. Such a clause typically includes a description of the 
type of situations that are covered by it, for instance war, strikes, acts of God, and 
eventually pandemics. However, not all contracts contain such a clause and even when 
they do, the clause might not cover pandemics (or it may be formulated in such a way that 
it is unclear whether it does). In the absence of a force majeure or similar type clause, the 
applicable law fills in the contractual gaps to resolve the dispute.   
 
For instance, if English law is the applicable law, then the doctrine of frustration is 
applicable. The threshold for frustration is high; the contract needs to be either impossible 
to perform,4 illegal,5 or the main purpose of the contract must have been thwarted.6 This 
could cover difficulties caused by a pandemic but would not cover all contracts that are 
disrupted because of the pandemic. For instance, it would not cover the situation where 
the contract can still be performed, although performance might now be significantly more 
onerous for one of the parties. Therefore, if the contract does not contain an adequate 
force majeure clause it could very well be that the contract cannot be terminated without 
one of the parties being in breach and thus liable to pay damages. Other jurisdictions have 
similar doctrines, such as force majeure in France and Unmöglichkeit der Leistung in 
Germany, although these each operate somewhat differently and will have a different 
threshold as to when a contract can be terminated without incurring liability.  
 
The parties to an international commercial contract can insert a choice of law clause in 
their contract for the application of non-state rules.  With non-state rules is meant the body 
of transnational commercial law that is either developed by international organisations and 
trade associations  (such as restatements of laws and standard terms and conditions) or 
emerges spontaneously from usage by merchants (trade usages) and is refined through 
application by courts/tribunals (creating general principles of transnational commercial 
law). Non-state rules are thus created by other entities than the state and aim to facilitate 
international commerce through legal unification. Whilst a choice for non-state rules is not 
permitted in most jurisdictions in litigation, it is usually permitted for arbitration.7 This choice 
could be formulated in a precise manner by referring to a transnational commercial law 
3  
4 Taylor v Caldwell [1863] EWHC QB J1. 
5 Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1942] UKHL 4. 
6 Krell v Henry [1903] 2 KB 740. 
7 See for instance, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985) Art. 28. 
Legislation based on this model law has been adopted by 83 states. 
instrument by name (such as the UNIDROIT Principles) or could employ a formula such 
as general principles of commercial law, accepted transnational commercial practices, or 
the lex mercatoria. It is then up to the tribunal to find and decide the general principles and 
concrete rules of the lex mercatoria. There is no agreement on what the substance of the 
lex mercatoria is, as the intense debate on the subject shows.8 Tribunals often refer to 
transnational commercial law instruments as an expression or reflection of the lex 
mercatoria;9 that is to say as a source of the lex mercatoria or as the written evidence of 
the lex mercatoria. The instrument that is used most often for this purpose is the UNIDROIT 
Principles (others include the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) and the 
Principles of Latin America Contract Law (PLACL) as well as the Incoterms10). 
 
II. Transnational Commercial Law Instruments 
 
a) The Convention for the International Sale of Goods 
 
The CISG is also regularly used by courts/tribunals as a reflection of the lex mercatoria. It 
is debatable whether conventional law should be included in the lex mercatoria (or indeed 
whether codified non-state rules should be included at all) but regardless of whether it is 
desirable it is often applied in this way. Aside from being used as lex mercatoria, the CISG 
is a leading convention that is ratified by 93 states as of 2020.   
 
The underlying principles of the CISG are characterised by internationality, good faith, 
uniformity in interpretation, pragmatism, and freedom of contract. The CISG has a strong 
favor contractus approach: preserving the contractual relationship is key. It offers limited 
possibilities to rely on force majeure. There is no rebus sic stantibus type provision which 
allows the contract to be modified or terminated if there is a significant change in 
circumstances.  
 
Art. 79 discusses non-liability for performance: 
 
A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he proves that the failure was due 
to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be expected to have taken 
the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or 
overcome it, or its consequences.11 
 
Non-liability is only valid for the duration of the event.12 Whilst the party in breach will not 
be liable for any damages, the other party can still avoid the contract if the breach is 
ther party from exercising any 
13 The contract is only terminated 
when it is avoided and not retroactively upon occurrence of the impeding event.14 
8 See for instance, Klaus Peter Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria (Kluwer Law 
Transnational Commercial Law. 
9 See the UNILEX database for examples: http://www.unilex.info/instrument/principles. 
10 The International Commercial Terms created by the International Chamber of Commerce to facilitate the 
international sale of goods, available at: https://iccwbo.org/resources-for-business/incoterms-
rules/incoterms-2020/. 
11 CISG Art. 79 (1). 
12 CISG Art. 79 (3). 
13 CISG Art .79 (5). 
14  the 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/ziegel79.html.  
Understanding how impediments should be interpreted is key to understanding the scope 
of the article. The definition of impediment is not immediately clear from the article, which 
has been criticised for its generality and lack of detail.15 
 
The CISG Advisory Council is a private initiative from a group of scholars and publishes 
opinions on the interpretation of the CISG. Whilst these opinions are not canon, they have 
persuasive value as they are based on caselaw and the legislative history of the CISG. 
Opinion 7 discusses the interpretation of Article 79 and includes an analysis of existing 
caselaw. It explains that overall, courts and tribunals take a strict interpretation of Article 
79. Courts do not rely excessively on domestic law interpretations of hardship and force 
majeure which might have a broader approach, and they maintain high standards for 
exemption of liability.16  
 
Clearly Covid-19 can lead to economic hardship. Would such a situation fall within the 
scope of Article 79? The legislative history clarifies that impediment should not only cover 
situations where it is physically impossible to perform the contract but also, under limited 
circumstances, those situations in which it is economically problematic to do so.17 Overall, 
however, the courts have taken a reticent approach to accepting economic hardship as an 
excuse for non-performance.18 It could be that Covid-19 represents such a sufficiently 
exceptional situation that courts would take a more flexible approach, however it could also 
be said that certainty in deciding contractual disputes is needed now more than ever and 
therefore the standards for exemption are likely to remain high.  
 
If Article 79 is rather general, how should the courts, then interpret any request for relief? 
According to Article 7, any matters covered by the CISG but not explicitly discussed should 
be settled by relying upon the principles underlying the CISG, If such principles are not 
found, the courts should turn to the applicable law to settle the issue (and not the lex fori 
as some courts have the tendency to do).19 Turning to the applicable law creates 
uncertainty for the parties and should therefore be the last resort. It is not recommended 
that the applicable law should be used to further define what an impediment is or whether 
hardship should be covered, given the diverse approaches taken by different jurisdictions. 
This would lead to unpredictable results for the parties because they cannot anticipate the 
outcome of the dispute that well. Rather, courts should rely upon the extensive CISG 
caselaw to interpret the Convention and extend the scope of impediment to include 
exceptional economic hardship. It would be especially appropriate to grant such relief if 
the equilibrium of the contract is destroyed and where one of the parties stands to profit 
whilst the other party suffers extensive losses because of the unforeseen event.20  
 
15  
International Sale of Goods (CISG) as Rorschach Test: The Homeward Trend and Exemption for 
Delivering Non- International Law Review 29. 
16 
2007, http://www.cisgac.com/cisgac-opinion-no7/.  
17 - The UN-Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem-79.html.  
18 
http://www.cisgac.com/cisgac-opinion-no7/. 
19 
Business Law Journal 333. 
20  
tive Law 5-28, 14. 
The approach of the CISG favours certainty in contractual relationships rather than 
allowing for flexibility should the situation change. At the same time the pragmatism that is 
reflected in the CISG through, for instance, the requirement to mitigate damages (Article 
77) and allow for a period of grace/nachfrist (Article 49), suggests that the parties should 
maintain if possible, a certain flexibility towards each other if situations change. The CISG 
does not include an explicit duty to renegotiate in cases of hardship but there is caselaw 
suggesting that such a duty is implied in the principles underlying the CISG.21 This 
suggests that exempting a party from liability in exceptional circumstances such as Covid-
19 for reasons of economic hardship is permitted under the CISG. 
 
b) The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
 
The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (first published in 1994) 
are a restatement of international commercial law. They are the result of a comparative 
study between the commercial laws of different states and the common practices between 
international merchants and they seek to provide the best possible legal solutions for 
facilitating international trade.22 They can be applied if the parties choose them as the 
governing law, if the parties have chosen the lex mercatoria as the governing law, and to 
interpret the contract, the law, and international conventions (such as the CISG).23  
 
a contract becomes more onerous for one of the parties, that party is nevertheless bound 
 The official 
commentary reinforces that even if the contract is now significantly more costly or no longer 
beneficial for one of the parties, they still need to perform, unless there are exceptional 
circumstances.24 Whilst economic risks can undoubtedly cause a significant imbalance in 
the contract and provide difficulties, hardship should only be applied if the economic 
difficulties go significantly beyond normal market developments.25 The consequences of 
Covid-19 would qualify as such a development, given that the scale of disruptiveness 
clearly goes beyond any expected economic disruption.   
 
Artic
supervening circumstances are such that they lead to a fundamental alteration of the 
d 
party and the party must not have assumed the risk for such an event. This means that if 
the contract contains a clause where the party has assumed the risk for a pandemic 
occurring, they could not rely on the provisions of hardship. This could either be explicitly 
(if the contract refers to a pandemic/epidemy) or implicitly (if the party assumes all risks no 
matter outside events occurring for instance).  To qualify, the event must have become 
known or occurred after the conclusion of the contract. Therefore, it is unlikely contracts 
concluded after March 2020 could rely upon this article to be exempted from liability. 
 
21 
 
22 
(1994-95) 69(5) Tulane Law Review 1121-1148, 1129. 
23 Preamble (Purpose of the Principles). 
24 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2016, 217. 
25 
657-669, 662. 
The effects of hardship (Article 6.2.3) are that the disadvantaged party is first entitled to 
request renegotiations, but such a request does not of itself entitle the party to withhold 
performance. If these negotiations are unsuccessful, they can turn to the court who, if it 
finds hardship may terminate the agreement or adapt the contract to reach an equilibrium 
between the parties which could according to the official comments on the article entail a 
price recalibration. Equilibrium should not be interpreted as contractual fairness but should 
effect on the purpose of the contract.26 For instance, if an electronics company cannot 
source specific goods because of a lockdown caused by Covid-19 they will have no need 
of transportation. The carriage contract that they have with a truck company can still be 
performed given the trucks can still ride between A and B. However, there is no purpose 
to the contract anymore for the electronics company if they have no goods that need to be 
transported.   
 
Article 7.1.7 discusses force majeure. Force majeure is a container concept that means 
different things depending on the jurisdiction. The official comments on the Article discuss 
that the term was chosen because it is well-known in international trade and covers the 
same ground as the common law concept of frustration and the civil law concept of force 
majeure but it should not be seen as identical to these domestic law concepts.27 The official 
-
to an impediment beyond its control and that it could not reasonably be expected to have 
taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have 
28  
 
Article 7.17 furthermore states that if the impediment is only temporary than it has effect 
terminate the contract or to withhold performance or request interest 
Therefore, like the CISG, it excuses liability for damages, but it does not waive other rights.  
Whilst under the CISG, impediment is interpreted to include economic hardship, this is not 
the case for the UPICC. As the UPICC has a separate article on hardship, impediment 
should be interpreted in a strict manner and refers to an event that makes the contract 
impossible to perform.29 Whilst Covid-19 does make some contracts impossible to perform 
and this provision can therefore be relied upon by the disadvantaged party, for other 
contracts there will thus be a need to rely on the hardship provisions to escape liability 
rather than on the force majeure provisions.  
 
The UPICC offer a more comprehensive approach to hardship and non-performance than 
the CISG. It even confers (controversially) the power on courts/tribunals to adapt the 
contract to restore the equilibrium (which the CISG does not do). At the same time the 
UPICC also emphasise the exceptionality of the event, again safeguarding the contractual 
obligations. The official comments stress that these articles would mainly be applied to 
long term contracts, therefore for shorter and single transactions the approach would be 
more stringent.30  
26 -Term Relational Contracts and the UNIDROIT Principles of 
Australian International Law Journal 185, 188. 
27 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2016, 240. 
28 Ibid, 241. 
29 
 5 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 5-28, 15. 
30 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2016, 242. 
 
Good contractual relationships are at the centre of the UPICC. Parties should first 
negotiate if there is hardship.  The UPICC emphasise the general principles of good faith 
and fair dealing (Article 1.7) and incorporate a specific duty of cooperation (Article 5.1.3). 
Parties should be flexible and cooperative towards one another, and whether they 
demonstrate this cooperation can play a part in the deliberations of the court/tribunal. 
 
Both the CISG and the UPICC refer to the temporality of the event, which means 
performance could be merely suspended. Whilst one hopes that Covid-19 is a temporary 
event, the duration of it is likely to be long-term, certainly months and perhaps years. The 
courts should take into account that it is unforeseeable how long the pandemic will continue 
and therefore this might favour termination over suspension.  
 
III. Principles of the Lex Mercatoria  
 
a) Applying the Lex Mercatoria 
 
If a tribunal/court is applying the lex mercatoria they might choose to use transnational 
instruments such as the UPICC or the CISG (or both). The court might also come to a 
reasoned conclusion of what the general principles of transnational commercial law and 
trade usages are that should be applied.  
 
Trade usages are considered implied terms of the contract under Article 9 of the CISG and 
Articles 1.8 and 4.3 of the UPICC. They form the cornerstone of the lex mercatoria. Usages 
clarify how force majeure and hardship should be interpreted in different trades (which 
could mean a broader or stricter interpretation depending on the trade) and need to be 
applied by the court/tribunal, immediately after the express contractual provisions. 
 
A key principle of the lex mercatoria is a strong favor contracus; that is to say the need to 
interpret the legal provisions in a way that as far as possible upholds the contract. 
Termination is a last option. This combined with the principle of pacta sunt servanda means 
that under the lex mercatoria, terminating a contract should only be done as the last resort. 
Legal uncertainty is one of the key detriments for trading abroad and therefore predictability 
and security are important for the contracting parties.31 The barrier to non-liability for non-
performance is thus high. This means that in principle even in times of Covid-19 the court 
should uphold the contract and the obligations of the parties as far as possible. Clearly this 
situation affects a myriad of contracts and certainty is thus even more important.  
 
Good faith is a key principle of the lex mercatoria and the UPICC. Good faith is also one 
of the principles underlying the CISG although from the wording it seems that it is the 
Convention rather than the contract that needs to be interpreted in good faith. The wording 
of the good faith principle is vague because the CISG is trying to bridge common law and 
civil law.32 English common law does not recognise an overall good faith obligation, 
differently from civil law. Good faith is recognised as a principle of the lex mercatoria, 
probably partly because the origins of the lex mercatoria are in Roman law and much of 
its development took place in Italy and France. Furthermore, the revival of the lex 
31  
32 For an analysis 
And Common Law - -98. 
mercatoria started with the work of French scholars.33 Good faith would imply that the 
parties deal with each other in a transparent and honest manner. The lex mercatoria 
emphasises equity and fairness.34 This should especially be taken into account if 
unexpected outside events such as Covid-19 cause significant hardship for one of the 
parties. 
 
The principle of Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus allows the parties to modify or terminate an 
agreement because of serious disruptions and is considered part of the lex mercatoria. In 
combination with the good faith requirement it means that parties should be willing to 
renegotiate. If an event happens that would not have been in the contemplation of the 
parties (like Covid-19) then the fundamental changes to their obligations would not have 
been intended by the parties and this vitiates their consent.35 Therefore, there is a strong 
case for saying that despite the key principle of contractual certainty, extreme economic 
hardship caused by Covid-19 is a cause for renegotiation.  
 
b) Conclusion 
 
The WHO declared Covid-19 a pandemic on 11 March 2020. The effects of the pandemic 
were already felt before that and certainly will continue to be felt for the foreseeable future. 
Both the CISG and the UPICC emphasise that for the terms of the contract to be vitiated, 
the event should not be foreseeable. The question of foreseeability is complicated, 
however. Can it be foreseen that a pandemic might occur at some point? Yes, of course, 
it has happened in the past and will happen again. Can it be foreseen in what manner it 
will occur or when? No, of course not. Caselaw shows that courts struggle with the notion 
of foreseeability, especially in long-term contracts, that might have decades of running 
time. Within that time all sorts of events including wars and natural disasters can be 
expected to happen, even if we do not know the precise shape they will take. A pandemic 
can be expected to occur at some point given that in human history we see a pattern of 
disease outbreaks, but how likely it is to happen, and would the parties have contemplated 
this at the time of contracting? There is a grey area with a margin of appreciation. The next 
years will undoubtedly bring contradictory caselaw on the foreseeability of Covid-19.  
 
For any contract concluded after 11 March 2020 it would be difficult to rely upon the 
pandemic as an excuse for non-performance. It could even be argued that before 11 
March, the outbreak was already so prominent that it was foreseeable that this would 
create hardship.36 It is also clear that the exact consequences of the pandemic could not 
be foreseen on 11 March and there are still more questions than answers with regards to 
the immediate future. But clearly the pandemic itself is now a reality and relying on it as an 
excuse for non-performance will be more difficult. This is not to say that it can never be 
relied upon but the party in breach will face a higher threshold to prove that the effects 
were unforeseen. This makes the inclusion of a force majeure/hardship clause even more 
33 (Lex 
http://www.trans-lex.org/000001. 
34 William Mitchell, An Essay on the Early History of the Law Merchant (Cambridge University Press 1904) 
13. 
35 onal 
-28, 13. 
36 On 30 January 2020, the WHO already declared Covid-19 a public health emergency of international 
concern. 
important. This force majeure clause should cover pandemics explicitly to maximise the 
security of the parties. 37  
 
In conclusion it can be said that under the rules discussed, the approach is to favour 
certainty first. Therefore, the threshold to excuse non-performance is high. Whilst Covid-
19 is an exceptional situation and clearly could not have been expected by either party the 
importance of certainty for international commercial contracts is paramount and 
courts/tribunals will likely continue with a strict interpretation of these rules.  At the same 
time, the principles of good faith and fair dealing combined with the pragmatism of 
international trade also call for the parties to be cooperative and flexible towards one 
another in order to come as far as possible to an amicable settlement.  
 
  
37 See for example, ICC Force Majeure and Hardship Clauses, available at 
https://iccwbo.org/publication/icc-force-majeure-and-hardship-clauses/.  
